When Shipyards Are Full, Where Does New Capability Come From?.

Big fleets and new classes of ship dominate headlines. They also dominate budgets, yard time, and political attention.

The reality described in the Canadian Seapower report is simpler and more uncomfortable: Western shipyards are stretched, workforces are fragile, and industrial capacity is becoming a strategic constraint on seapower.

If Canada wants more maritime capability this decade, it has to look beyond traditional ship programmes and toward agile, modular platforms that can be built and deployed on much shorter timelines.

The bottleneck: ambition without throughput

The report frames today’s environment as a “transformational era” shaped by economic nationalism, supply chain fragility, and the erosion of industrial capacity across Western shipbuilding.

A few key points stand out:

• Countries are investing heavily in domestic yards, but throughput has not kept pace with demand.
• In the United States, naval shipbuilding workforces experience roughly 30% annual turnover, while production on key classes remains stagnant.
• Canada’s workforce is comparatively more stable, but earlier austerity hollowed out mid-level program management and systems integration expertise.

Every major shipbuilding nation is hunting for industrial capacity among its allies, asking the same questions: where can we get ships, and how do we meet the demand signal in time?

Against that backdrop, relying on a small number of large, complex programmes as the primary source of new capability becomes a high-risk bet.

Force-design turbulence: fleets are diversifying

At the same time, navies are rethinking what a fleet looks like. The report describes a period of “force-design turbulence” where large multi-mission combatants, corvettes, uncrewed systems, and attritable platforms coexist in new combinations.

This shift is driven by:

• Rapid advances in sensors, autonomy, and AI.
• The need for distributed operations in contested and littoral environments.
• Recognition that not every task requires a high-end combatant.

There is a catch: Western industrial bases have not yet adapted to produce smaller, expendable or “attritable” systems at scale, or to replace them quickly in wartime.

So capability is pulled in two directions:

• big, complex ships that consume yard capacity, and
• smaller, distributed systems that the industrial base is still learning how to build at volume.

Why agile platforms matter when yards are full

When yards are saturated, the question shifts from “what could we build in an ideal world?” to “what can we bring into service soon enough to matter?”

Agile, modular platforms help on several fronts:

• Industrial flexibility – They can be built in different facilities, sometimes closer to the user, reducing pressure on the largest yards.
• Shorter development cycles – Simpler hulls and modular payloads allow incremental upgrades instead of waiting for a new class.
• Complementary roles – They extend the reach of existing fleets rather than competing with major combatants for funding and slipway space.

From a human behaviour perspective, this demands a mindset shift. Decision-makers are used to equating capability with visible steel and tonnage. The more abstract value of a network of fast, adaptable craft is harder to communicate, even if it delivers more coverage and responsiveness per dollar in the near term.

What this could look like in practice

The DACV (Dynamic Air Cushion Vehicle) being developed by Celerity Craft is one example of what an agile platform family might contribute to this problem set.

The technical concept is straightforward: a three-hulled design that channels an energised column of air under the vessel to create lift and thrust, reducing drag and enabling roughly double the speed at about half the power compared to conventional boats.

On top of that physics:

• High speed and efficiency – Target speeds around 60 knots with much lower energy use.
• Amphibious access – Operation across water, shallow areas, mudflats, and shorelines, including ice and beach landings.
• Simpler maintenance – Fewer components in the water, with lower maintenance needs and reduced spare parts inventory.
• Environmental benefits – Low wake, low underwater noise, and a pathway to zero-emission operation.

From a fleet-design point of view, that translates into the ability to:

• Move people, sensors, and supplies quickly between larger vessels, shore bases, and austere landing points.
• Support Arctic and coastal missions where port infrastructure is limited or seasonal.
• Trial autonomy, new sensors, and mission packages on a relatively low-risk, high-iteration platform.

Crucially, vessels like these can be produced in smaller yards or dedicated facilities, while the largest shipyards focus on major combatants and auxiliaries. That creates a parallel track for capability growth rather than a queue.

Sovereignty, industry, and the role of Canadian IP

Admiral Topshee’s remarks underline that domestic shipbuilding is itself a “genuine sovereign capability,” with the National Shipbuilding Strategy injecting an estimated $38.7 billion into the economy and sustaining more than 21,000 jobs between 2012 and 2025.

Agile platforms developed from Canadian intellectual property fit this story in three ways:

1. They reinforce sovereignty – Keeping design, IP, and high-value engineering work in Canada strengthens national control over critical capabilities.
2. They create exportable solutions – Smaller, scalable craft suited to coastal, archipelagic, and Arctic conditions are relevant to many allies facing similar constraints.
3. They fill operational gaps while large programmes mature – Providing lift, logistics, surveillance, and presence in places where big ships are scarce, seasonal, or too valuable to risk.

In behavioural terms, this aligns with how publics and policymakers increasingly view defence: as an economic sector with high-quality jobs, innovation, and export potential, rather than a cost centre alone.

A practical way forward

None of this argues against major combatants, ice-capable corvettes, or new submarines. Those programmes remain central to Canada’s long-term seapower. The point is that they cannot be the only answer when industrial capacity, workforces, and capital are constrained.

A pragmatic approach over the next decade could include:

• Parallel investment in agile, high-speed, autonomy-ready platforms to extend the reach of existing fleets.
• Pilot projects with operators such as the Coast Guard and Arctic logistics organisations to validate use cases and refine designs.
• Procurement criteria that value responsiveness, coverage, and upgradeability alongside traditional measures like displacement or weapon fit.

When shipyards are full, capability has to come from somewhere else. Agile platforms give Canada a way to grow real, operational seapower on timelines measured in years rather than decades—while building domestic IP, industrial depth, and export opportunities that support both security and economic resilience.